With Stephen Curry and Kevin Durant locked in, can Warriors duo become best ever in 2017-18?
The Golden State Warriors officially signed Stephen Curry and Kevin Durant to new contracts on July 25. Without looking too far ahead (Durant could technically hit the open market next summer), we are taking a look at what this already historic duo can accomplish in Year 2.
Nothing is predetermined in the NBA. Events may seem inevitable in retrospect, but that’s only when results meet our expectations.
For example, the Golden State Warriors just won the NBA title, capping off a year in which they were heavy favorites at every turn. That run has been widely characterized as easy, boring or unfair.
It didn’t have to work out this way, though. Kevin Durant did not have to learn the complex Warriors offense faster than most players learn simple schemes. Nor did he have to break decade-long habits like they were glass, rather than plexi.
Stephen Curry did not have to take such a dramatic step back to acclimate Durant. He didn’t have to return to his MVP level when Durant got hurt, and didn’t have to have one of the greatest runs to the Finals in NBA history. After reaching the ultimate round, he did not have to set up KD time after time, and Durant did not have to overwhelmingly deliver.
What made the 2016-17 Warriors so incredible was not their unfair roster, but the historic way in which their players came through. We look back at Michael Jordan‘s legacy and consider him the greatest; we don’t talk about his team being unfair. “Greatest” is a term used in discussions about these Warriors, too, but only as an entire team.
Of course, Jordan deserves more credit than Curry or Durant individually. He played with Scottie Pippen and Dennis Rodman (supporting stars similar in value to Klay Thompson and Draymond Green), but never had a teammate like Durant or Curry.
Even if Pippen, Rodman, Thompson and Green cancel out, the conclusion here is incredible: Curry and Durant together are better than Michael Jordan alone.
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This may not sound shocking. In most fields, two is generally better than one. That adage rarely rings true in the NBA. The best player on the court holds significantly, if not exponentially more value than the second-best. Whether we apply that equation to teammates or opponents, the greatest players of all-time should generally outweigh two run-of-the-mill greats.
History makes this rather irrefutable. Going back to 1980, 26 of the NBA’s 38 titles have gone to top-10 all-time players (according to ESPN’s NBA rank). Magic Johnson and Larry Bird won eight of 11 titles between 1980-90. Jordan and Hakeem Olajuwon won all eight from 1991-98. Tim Duncan and Shaquille O’Neal won seven more (not counting Shaq’s post-prime Heat title or Duncan’s post-prime 2014 title) from 1999-07. Kobe, No. 12 on ESPN rank, won two of the next three, and LeBron James has won three this decade. If you count Shaq and Duncan’s post prime titles and those won by Kobe Bryant (No. 12 on ESPN rank) without Shaq, the number jumps to 30 of 38.
For contrast, let’s look at the leading duos on the 12 championship teams that did not feature top-10 players. Moses Malone and Julius Erving (1), Isiah Thomas and Rodman or Joe Dumars (2), Chauncey Billups and Ben Wallace (1), old Shaq and Dwyane Wade (1), Kevin Garnett and Paul Pierce (1), Bryant and Pau Gasol (2), Dirk Nowitzki and Tyson Chandler (1), old Duncan and Kawhi Leonard (1), Curry and Thompson (1) and Curry and Durant (1).
Curry and Durant feel like outliers. The dominance with which they won their title seems to belong with those first 26 rather than these 12. Does that mean that either one of them is a top-10 player of all-time? Probably not in an absolute sense. In tandem, they probably both are.
During the 2017 NBA Playoffs, Curry averaged 28.1 points, 6.7 assists and 6.2 rebounds per game while posting a true-shooting percentage of 65.9. Jordan’s best statistical postseason (1991) saw him average 31.1 points, 8.4 assists and 6.4 rebounds, with a true-shooting percentage of 60.
In the 2017 NBA Finals, Durant averaged 35.2 points, 8.2 rebounds and 5.4 assists per game, with a true-shooting percentage of, um, 69.8. True-shooting percentage often highlights the hidden value in less-than-eye-popping splits, but in this case it sells Durant short: He shot 55.6 percent from the field, 47.4 percent from three and 92.7 percent from the line.
The duo creates an impossible dilemma for opponents. One guy is impossible to defend on the ball, the other impossible to guard off of it.
Early on last season, the Warriors were confused as to which guy was which. They often attempted to run things through Durant while Curry cut and spaced the floor. The assumption was that Durant’s size and athleticism would command double teams, while Curry’s shooting served as the ultimate off-ball threat.
Over time, they learned that they had it backwards. Despite physical appearances, defenses congregate around Curry more than they do Durant. His deep off-the-dribble threes pose a greater threat than anything Durant is capable of.
During his unanimous MVP year, Curry led the league with 1.07 points per isolation possession. No one else averaged above 1.01. Durant, at 0.99, was fifth.
Even last season, Curry was better in isolation (1.09 PPP, fourth in NBA) than Durant (1.05 PPP, seventh). This, despite the uncharacteristically average 37 percent that Curry shot on off-the-dribble threes.
Not only were the Warriors relatively slow to recognize Curry’s on-ball superiority, but also Durant’s off-ball supremacy. Conventional wisdom says that the game’s greatest shooter would be its greatest spacing threat. As it turns out, this is where Durant’s physical tools make a larger impact.
When defenses rotate late to Curry, they give up a three to a 45-percent shooter. That is not an ideal outcome, but it is similar to giving up a three to Klay Thompson, Kyle Korver or J.J. Redick. Sure, Curry can cut better and shoot from deeper than anyone, but the shots themselves are not wholly different.
When defenders do reach him in time, the results are better. He has the handle and skill to attack a closeout, get into the lane and finish, but he’s not extremely explosive. Compare this to Durant, who can blow by late-arriving defenders, get to the rim and dunk with authority in what seems like half a second.
Durant is also tougher to deny. As a cutter, Curry can be held, bumped and fronted. He’s 6’3″, and doesn’t have the John Wall, Russell Westbrook-type strength to make up for it. Durant is 6’10” with a 7’5″ wingspan. He takes power strides. He can fight through contact. It is simply easier for him to get open, and to get the ball whether he is or isn’t.
There’s a reciprocal quality to this. Curry being better than Durant on the ball means he draws more attention. Durant being better than Curry off the ball means he takes fuller advantage of the attention his teammate draws.
In Game 5 of the Finals, the Warriors fully exploited this perfect relationship.
Golden State Warriors
Steve Kerr‘s offense operates on principles of cutting, ball movement and activating every inch of the floor. Curry-Durant pick-and-rolls run somewhat counter to this. By bringing his two greatest weapons together, Kerr is shrinking the floor. He’s also shrinking the defensive options and margin for error. He is taking the beautiful relationship of Curry as playmaker and Durant as play finisher and extracting a concentrate.
We learned long ago that the only way to defend Curry around a ball screen is to double. You can’t switch. You can’t go over. Obviously, you can’t go under. This is what has made the Curry-Green pick-and-roll so dominant over the years. The only option was to trap Curry, leaving an expert roll man and passer to run a 4-on-3.
With Durant as the screener, the calculation really doesn’t change. Defenses have to give Durant the open threes, downhill drives and playmaking opportunities they’ve always given Green. If not, they let Curry go to work.
Kerr’s decision to not brandish this strategy until the last possible minute made sense. Once the league sees something, it starts looking for ways to stop it. Next season, Curry-Durant pick-and-rolls will face blitzing third defenders, pre-switches and new looks that NBA coaches are more suited to conceive than I.
The problem with these strategies is that they are exceedingly difficult to time and coordinate. They lead to miscommunications, breakdowns and easy bucket opportunities. Just as the league prepares for Curry-Durant pick-and-rolls, the Warriors will prepare for the adjustments. Curry and Durant are high I.Q. players and extremely willing passers, in sync with their teammates and in touch with their coaching staff.
Think back to the 2014-15 Warriors, who won 67 games and a title. It was also the team’s first year within Kerr’s intricate system. Their offense, as great as it was, had room to grow, and it did. Improving on 67 wins seemed impossible, but they did.
If 2016-17 was the adjustment year for Curry and Durant, it follows that 2017-18 will be the jell year. Whether that means another massive win streak, a win total in the 70s, an MVP for either guy or another run at an undefeated postseason, who knows. All of those things are in play. They will also depend on what Thompson, Green and the rest of the Warriors roster does.
Next: 5 takeaways from the 2017 NBA Finals
What we know is this: Year 1 of the Curry-Durant combo devastated the league in a way that few duos ever had. It rendered a Finals line of 33.6 points, 12.0 rebounds and 10.0 assists on 63.0 true shooting from the greatest player since Jordan completely meaningless. It is hard to fathom an even better Year 2, but even harder not to.