San Antonio Spurs: Dissecting LaMarcus Aldridge’s Defense

Throughout the senescent stage of Tim Duncan‘s career, somehow the San Antonio Spurs’ methodology has been viewed differently than before. Perception of what the Spurs value as an organization has slightly changed.

Since their unfathomable playoff run in 2012, many have labeled Gregg Popovich and his troops as offensive maniacs and geniuses, almost reaching a psychopathic level with their play-sets.

2012 is forgotten in San Antonio’s novel of history, because it wasn’t finished with a championship banner.  When, in reality, it navigated the franchise into this unassailable Finals pick for the next handful of years.  San Antonio closed out the final 23 games of the 2011-12 season with a 21-2 record, lacerating teams for 111.4 points per game during those wins. Circling the Spurs on the schedule was comparable to requesting your last meal in prison before walking the inevitable Green Mile.

Entering the playoffs, Popovich’s hunger wasn’t satisfied. We all know him to be a crusader for constant refinement, never believing his team can “peak” until the champagne bursts open. They marched through the 2012 Playoffs, earning a 10-0 record in a one-month span (April 29 to May 29). In those 10 matchups, the average margin of victory was that of a video game — outscoring opponents by 12.2 points in the most competitive part of the year.

To everyone, they became an offensive powerhouse. In a matter of one season, San Antonio made everyone forget about the primitive foundation this franchise set for itself during the past four championships.

Defensive pressure.  Defensive dexterity.  Defensive discipline.

When the jewel known as Tim Duncan blessed the city in 1997, the infrastructure was originally built on stopping other teams from scoring. While they did form into an offensive engine, the main tune-up for San Antonio was on the other end.

It’s the character this train started with, and didn’t back away from in the 9-year span of stacking Larry O’Brien trophies.

With Duncan and David Robinson slaughtering like it’s 1999:

With Duncan having his second-highest year in Win Shares and ruining the Lakers’ 4-peat chances:

With an Argentinian coming along to help cultivate the dynasty:

:

To assemble  a defense this strong is among the hardest accomplishments you can aim for.  To improve  it, is asking for a combination of precise attention to detail from a coaching staff and keen eyes for the draft.  To maintain  it, you’re just hoping for a dream.

Over the course of these four championship years — earning a combined record of 277-103 (.729) which includes the playoffs — the Spurs organized a stretch of defensive teams that may never get the proper amount of respect.  The average defensive rating for these four teams was 98.35, a number that’s head and shoulders better than any defense from 2014-15. Granted, the NBA offenses have evolved tremendously since the mid-2000’s, so now it’s nearly impossible to have a defensive rating lower than 100.

Still, 98.35 was the Spurs’ average.

In these four title seasons, Popovich had unreal defensive schemes. Teams had to work their rear ends off for a “good shot” against the Spurs, in which many were probably still contested with heavy wing pressure.  San Antonio held it’s opponents to an average of 42.5% from the field, and 33.6% from 3-point range during the 296 regular season games of these runs.

Maybe the most impressive feat, however, was that Popovich ingrained the best form of discipline with his groups:  Defending without fouling.

As you noticed, the Spurs never allowed their opponents to shoot more than 23.8 free throws per game during this era. It consistently put them in the top five in terms of keeping other teams off the line, ultimately eliminating easy points. If you wanted to get past these guys, it had to be from good shot selection … because they weren’t going to foul you.

Now, understand:  I’m not — by any means — saying that San Antonio has taken a step back on the defensive end since their golden days. Their machine still ranked 3rd in fewest points allowed per 100 possessions for 2013-14, with Kawhi Leonard putting the clamps on Miami’s whole perimeter rotation in the Finals.

To top it off, they were neck-and-neck with Utah as the league’s most tenacious defense after March 1 of last season, with a net rating of +14.3 in the final 29 games.  Had they kicked it into high gear a little earlier, the Spurs wouldn’t have played in a first-round matchup that mirrored World War II.

Instead, I’m referring to the perception around the recent Spurs.

They’ve turned into a team that most associate with unbelievable offensive creativity.

For them to get back to the grand stage and compete for the franchise’s 6th title, defense has to be the leading priority.  With majority of the players on the 2015-16 roster, the problem won’t rest in their mindsets.  Popovich is returning 10 players from last year’s roster, losing Tiago Splitter and Aron Baynes, and Cory Joseph.

The new (and massive) additions include LaMarcus Aldridge, David West, Ray McCallum, Jimmer Fredette, and Jonathon Simmons.  Now, with the 10 returning players and five main additions listed, that’s equal to the NBA’s maximum roster size (15).  It won’t be clear until training camp if Fredette, McCallum, or Simmons will hold on to their spots.

Nevertheless, it’s not hard to pinpoint the No. 1 reason for San Antonio’s summer success.

He’s 6-11, 30 years old, and fresh off an All-NBA Second Team bid.  All it took was a business dinner with a head coach that has over 1,000 wins and the ability to count to five for Aldridge to leave Portland.

While the Trail Blazers are losing their second-leading scorer in franchise history, it’s the Spurs that have work to synthesize Aldridge into the winning culture. By inking the most gifted offensive power forward in the game, it could be a difficult task to get everyone on the same page:  Stabilizing the defense is how they’ll survive the Western Conference in 2016, not by simply adding offensive skill.

Aldridge isn’t exactly new to playing in strong defensive structures. Terry Stotts grew in popularity for his offensive ideas in Dallas during the 2011 title run, but he was forced to re-invent the Blazers’ defense once he took over. Stotts was tired of seeing Portland get drenched by the West’s top competition, so he tried to model his defense after the top-notch systems in 2013-14 (Indiana, Chicago, San Antonio).

After studying those three defenses during the 2014 offseason, Stotts tried to alter the way Portland defended pick-and-rolls. Instead of attacking the ball-handler extremely hard (aggressive hedging) when he came off a screen, Stotts began to enforce his frontcourt players (Aldridge) to drop back and shut off the paint.  A positive result of this method is that it eliminates a ton of angles (passing or driving) for play-makers aiming to get within 15 feet of the basket. It makes it tougher on the guards, wastes the shot clock, and eventually leads to big men “living or dying” from longer distances.

It worked for Portland, as they continued improving on forcing teams into harder shots.  Last season, Aldridge and the Blazers caused opponents to shoot 26.3 mid-range attempts per game (second most), and those teams only shot 38.9% from this area.  That’s knocking out two things:  Forcing guys away from the beloved paint, while also forcing a lot of missed field goals.  You can’t ask for much more.

It’s also true — Robin Lopez was greatly responsible for making Aldridge’s life easier on defense. Having a center that loves to make up for his team’s mistakes with dramatic plays near the rim can allow forwards to “roam” a bit defensively. It took immense pressure off Aldridge in many games. He didn’t have to be the best defender on the court, and his belief seems to be “my scoring damage can make up for the points I do allow.”  His quiet personality doesn’t give off that vibe, but it’s just a natural thought within a veteran player’s mind.

Aldridge must come to a realization before he throws on a Spurs uniform this year. That ideology will be laughed at in this environment. You can go from “team savior” status to an unwanted asset in San Antonio — overnight — if you don’t have the utmost desire to defend.

Because of Portland’s scheme to hang back on the pick-and-roll, sometimes Aldridge appeared to be a bad defender.  A big issue is that he’s not a guy that excels in stepping out to defend 3-point shooting power forwards:

There’s a combination of factors that set Aldridge up for failure in these situations.  The most obvious is that Portland loved to switch on these pick-and-rolls, with Aldridge picking up Ellis on the left side, and Wesley Matthews transitioning over to Dirk.  Another issue that haunted Aldridge defensively:  His guards were ridiculously bad at defending the pick-and-roll ball handlers.  Matthews is a solid defender in one-on-one coverage and could really torment perimeter players, but putting him or Damian Lillard in screen-roll action often resulted in a nightmare.

Because of Matthews being too slow on the above screen-roll, Aldridge has no choice but to step over and show help on Ellis.  By the time Matthews realizes it and tries to recover on Dirk, it’s too late.  The Blazers (including Aldridge) would rather allow long-range looks off these plays, as it’s evident Aldridge and Lopez are dropping back in the paint.  Against most power forwards out there, it’s a smart move.  Just not against the unique big men from outside — which is why Dirk gashed Portland over and over.

Aldridge is actually competent when switching on the pick-and-roll, even against the fastest guards in basketball (Ellis). He’s just in no position to succeed whenever his guards aren’t capable of handling the roll/pop:

When a guard comes off the screen ready to attack (like Ellis above), Aldridge does one of the best jobs at containing his space.  He eliminates the paint as an option, but also has quick enough feet to step up for a contest on the jumper.  To be fair to Lillard, it appears that he slips in the play above. But it’s a clear example of how Portland gave Aldridge few chances to exceed on defense. The middle of the lane becomes a clear opening for Dirk to slip through, and Ellis burns them with a jump-pass to the big man.  Any time Aldridge attacks the guard heavy, it creates a dangerous situation.

In the pick-and-roll, there are also times when Aldridge falls asleep on his assignment. He can be accustomed to showing too much help on the ball-handler, not recognizing how the play is breaking down:

When Lillard and Matthews clearly have the top of the key under control, Aldridge continues to step over for more help on Devin Harris.  He sleeps on Dirk popping to the right elbow, and there’s simply no time to recover for a good challenge:

There were more positives out of Portland’s defense than negatives in 2014-15, but there’s no question that Aldridge will be integrated into a better scheme with San Antonio.  Popovich has groomed more capable and impressive defenders on the wing, and Duncan is still devastating to test near the rim (even at 39 years old this year).

Another way teams found a weak spot in Aldridge’s defense was by getting their power forward in “cross screen” action. This was very useful and nifty down in the post, where a player would set a screen for Dirk (or any post player) as he cut across the lane:

The dilemma about Aldridge’s speed (shown here) is that while he’s usually quick and sufficient with his lateral movements (side to side, able to slide his feet and keep ball-handlers in front of him), he’s not exactly the best with working through screens.  Once Dirk curled around the cross screens in the paint, he had clear openings for his favorite type of shot.

Another form of this was popular in Cleveland, with Kevin Love using a screen from Shawn Marion to get free on the opposite block.  This one, however, is based on Aldridge’s laziness when moving through screens:

Give Popovich a full month with Aldridge once the regular season begins, and I guarantee the effort, intensity, and skill of these defensive plays rise a few notches.

In the NBA, we often rave about the concept of “team defense” and how a group of five must be excellent as a unit when making defensive decisions. That certainly holds true, but we shouldn’t conceal one major component.

One-on-one defense — guarding a player’s drive, or isolation play — is beyond important in this league.  There are more isolations on the pro level than college, so it’s necessary to have great defensive footwork and knowledge about your opponent.

Aldridge exhibits this nicely, and it’s also where his true quickness and agility shine as a defender:

As Kyle Korver is slashing with a flex cut through the lane, the belief is that Jeff Teague will set up Korver for a jumper on the left wing. Korver creates space for Atlanta here, by dribbling to the baseline and pulling the Matthews/Aldridge combo with him.  Once Korver gets rid of the ball, however, it’s Paul Millsap who has the green light to make a play.

Aldridge does about the best job you can ask for in terms of closing out on Millsap, the 35% outside shooter.  Pay close attention to Aldridge’s feet on the closeout.  He’s not completely rushing Millsap off the 3-point line, which most players would do.  If he closed with a full-fledged attack and sprinted toward Millsap, he’d get blown by after a solid pump-fake.

Instead, Aldridge plants his feet and stops his progress when he realizes Millsap is putting the ball on the floor.  From the perimeter all the way to the rim, his contest of Millsap’s drive is textbook for any big man to learn. Aldridge moves his feet well, keeps his guy attached to his hip, and still has the position to contest a possible mid-ranger if Millsap pulled up.  Once Millsap is near the restricted area, Aldridge forces a difficult shot attempt — without fouling across the arm.  It’s a wild, double-clutch layup, forced into a miss with Aldridge’s fundamental defense.

Even when the ball is switched from the the strong side to the weak side — leaving Aldridge with zero help — he’s able to handle and stop a drive:

He has the long arms to provide formidable coverage on “bigger” power forwards as well.  Aldridge may be leaner and not as old-school as some guys in the league, but the long reach does wonders for him:

The high screen-roll against teams that can ravage you from 3-point range is unguardable at times. With teams (like Portland) that love to take a few steps closer to the paint … you either have to be perfect at rotating your defense to open shooters, or equip your team with power forwards that are comfortable closing out long distances.  Aldridge was put in this environment a ton last season, considering how much of a “grace period” he gave other forwards before challenging:

When Teague wraps around the Millsap screen (even with Batum riding his side), Aldridge takes three steps back into the paint. The Hawks’ spacing is a beauty, and this makes it hard for Aldridge to rattle Millsap to the highest degree:

For as much ground as Aldridge had to cover, he still made a substantial closeout and contest on Millsap.  It’s just the ultimate struggle for teams that love to play big (with two 7-footers) against a court full of shooters.

Other opponents he faced in the pick-and-roll were just inexorable.  No matter which way Aldridge and the Blazers defended the Chris Paul–Blake Griffin 1-4 screen roll, it was ending in a positive outcome for the Clippers:

Here, Lillard did his best chasing the NBA’s top point guard around the screen. Naturally, he’s a little behind, with Meyers Leonard trying to hold off DeAndre Jordan from the lob attempt.  This is where it becomes impossible:  If Leonard steps up to cut off Paul, it’s Jordan who will get an open dunk.  Since Leonard stayed back in the paint, it had to be Aldridge who showed a little help on CP3’s drive.  That one little second of Aldridge stepping over is what opened up Griffin’s mid-ranger.

It was also impossible on the roll, 90% of the time.  Considering Aldridge can’t just give Paul an open right-handed layup, he has to take his eyes off Griffin.  Death happens:

It was actually weird seeing how Portland chose to defend Blake Griffin during the regular season. Griffin shot 25-of-62 (40.3%) against them in three games, and the Blazers mostly disrespected the range of his evolving jumper.  There wasn’t a sense of urgency to step out on Griffin, before or after he touched the ball:

Aldridge chose to play off Griffin on a large number of LA’s possessions … sometimes not even leaving the painted area.  This is how much space he allowed Griffin from beyond 15 feet:

In this area, Griffin shot 40.7% on nearly 5 attempts per game, which was a noticeable improvement from his 35.7% on 3.3 attempts the previous season.  Although 40% doesn’t sound frightening at first, I’m willing to bet Popovich won’t want to give up these looks on a consistent basis.

San Antonio will have to figure out the best way to utilize Aldridge in its pick-and-roll coverage, but the positive outlook is that Popovich has many options.  With the personnel they’ve added and the fact San Antonio has the most experience in the NBA with defending “unstoppable” pick-and-rolls — just look at their first-round opponent last year — it should be an area that improves for Aldridge.

With the Western Conference feeling so tightly packed in the win column that every single possession matters, it’s imperative that a player focuses on defense for the entire 24-second shot clock.  Way too often do you see players (or teams) give up once the clock reaches below five seconds, whether it’s due to energy or just eagerness to start a fastbreak.

Whenever he’s locked in, Aldridge gives a full commitment to possessions from start to finish, playing aggressive defense in multiple areas of the court:

This qualifies as a “A+ possession” for Aldridge, with his duties on both Love and Tristan Thompson.  First, he runs Love off the 3-point line as the time is winding down (five seconds), and then recovers on the drive.  To finish it, he times the block on Thompson perfectly, since he knew Thompson had to release it before the clock expires.  San Antonio will strive for these “total defensive” plays.

Shot-blocking hasn’t always glistened in Aldridge’s game, but he’s advanced his skill under the rim in the last two years.  His ratio of blocks to fouls was the highest of his career in 2014-15 (.544), recording 68 blocks to just 125 fouls.

On the surface, you could argue that it’s due to a step back in aggressive play, but that’s not entirely true.  He’s become smarter as a rim-protector, staying down until the right moment:

Some people still don’t understand the obstacle of not “biting” on the plethora of fakes by big men around the rim. When going against Zach Randolph — the NBA’s version of a middle school bully that pounds you against the cafeteria wall — it’s asking for a miracle to stop him without a foul.  To remain calm and use height/length to your advantage against Randolph, it takes serious discipline:

Unfortunately, Aldridge had a stop on the initial shot, but Randolph did the damage by knocking him out of the way for the offensive board.

Post-Up Defense

Having nine years in the league without a bid on any All-Defensive team, Aldridge may not carry the reputation or prestige of being an impressive defender.  Although he was the Defensive Player of the Year in the Big 12 for 2006, he’s found out how much harder it is to succeed against NBA post talent.

Nevertheless, Aldridge probably ranks up there with some of the most underrated post defenders in basketball.  He’ll never get the credit for being a consistent stopper in the middle.  That’s okay, since he’s never really made that his primary intention.  But one could argue that he deserves for recognition for his efforts in the paint, especially after exerting so much energy to turn Portland’s offense in the right direction.

In the post, the assortment of his size, IQ, footwork, and ability to stay away from fouls is what makes him special:

If the offensive player (Griffin) starts in the triple-threat position, Aldridge is prepared for him to put the ball on the ground.  Again, the ability to keep his feet in place and not let Griffin get around him is the most significant part.  He swats the shot away once he knows Griffin is too far inside to re-think his move.

If he starts out the defensive possession in a back-to-the-basket post-up, Aldridge has enough size to not let Griffin get closer inside.  By holding his own in this post-up, he forces Griffin to take a turnaround jumper (fully contested), with the shot clock under five seconds. Aldridge and the Spurs will live with these shots all season long.

Against players with a more physical post style (Randolph), the key for Aldridge on defense is a bit different:  He has to focus on preventing Randolph from even reaching  a good position in the middle.  It’s easier said than done.  Most of the shot clock is used to “push” Randolph back, or stay aggressive with his arms and legs to keep the gargantuan brute away from the paint.  Aldridge does the best job a coach could encourage, forcing Randolph into a 15-footer.  It’s better than him embarrassing you near the rim.

Guarding a post-up player without allowing them to back you inside is tough as it is.  To do it without committing a lot of fouls, and still being long enough to disrupt the release is almost unique to Aldridge:

As a defender in post position, Aldridge may get more chances to illustrate his skills in San Antonio.  In Portland, Aldridge had Robin Lopez as a security blanket near the rim.  Now, he has a much older player next to him in Tim Duncan.  To expect Duncan to play 29 minutes per game this year is likely asinine, since the frontcourt depth is through the roof.  Because of this, it’s easy to see Aldridge taking on more defensive responsibilities in his new habitat.

Based on the way the Spurs have defended recently, there will be a few more challenges in the paint.  Last season, San Antonio allowed the second fewest field goals per game from beyond 15-feet (36.5 per game). It was behind only the Pelicans, and it indicates they played terrific perimeter defense, which ultimately forced more shots inside.

The Spurs were also one of the best teams in causing misses near the rim, ranking 7th in defensive field goal percentage within 6 feet (57.2%). Aldridge should relish this, since he’s going to a team that cherishes tough defense first.

Compared to other defenders in the paint, Aldridge measures up better than anyone would expect.  With Portland last year, opponents attempted 6.1 shots against him “at the rim,” which is labeled as within five feet of the basket.  On those attempts, he only allowed a 45.1% efficiency.

He was right in the mix with a lot of notable big men:

Note:  I included Jordan Hill and Enes Kanter in the chart above only for perspective.  It justifies why these numbers are pretty indicative of what type of defender you are.  Hill and Kanter have earned the public perception of being horrific rim-protectors over the last three years.  It’s supported by the data, as the two are comfortably at the bottom.

I also threw in Tiago Splitter, since he’s essentially who Aldridge is replacing for the Spurs.  It seems that San Antonio is getting a considerable improvement in defense.

As crazy as it may seem because of their different styles, Aldridge’s best comparison as a rim defender was Draymond Green. Both were challenged 6.1 times per game at the rim, and both held their opponents below 47% shooting.

If a player allows a lot attempts in the restricted area, his percentage is bound to increase.  That’s what makes Noel, Ibaka, and Davis so special for the future:  They get contested a lot more during the season, yet still make it difficult for players to score against them.

For Aldridge, it’s not about leading this pack.  He’s not a pure defender at heart.  It only complements his overall game, and you could argue that he’s taken the best possible path for his career — If he hadn’t focused on developing his offensive game to such a high degree, he probably wouldn’t be an $80 million man.

The NBA has expanded into a league that reveres offensive innovations more than ever.  For the sake of his success, it’s a blessing for Aldridge to be known as an “offensive power forward.”

What San Antonio will discover, though, is a player that deserves higher esteem as a defender.  In actuality, Aldridge has achieved exactly what he aimed for after his Texas career:  Becoming one hell of a two-way star.