The Los Angeles Clippers Are Their Own Worst Enemies

Theoretically, the Los Angeles Clippers have all the necessary ingredients of an NBA championship-caliber team.

Let’s go down the checklist of perquisites (a thoroughly researched list, except not really) for confirmation:

• A ball-in-hand playmaker/creator? Check: Chris Paul.
• A dynamic go-to triple threat on offense? Check: Blake Griffin.
• A mobile rim-protecting big? Check: DeAndre Jordan.
• A dead-eye floor spacing spot up shooter? Check: J.J. Redick.
• A quintessential irrational confidence gunner off the bench? Check: Jamal Crawford
• A strong contingent of title-hungry vocal veterans? Check: Matt Barnes, Hedo Turkoglu, and Dahntay Jones.

So, when discussing the hierarchy of the Western Conference elites, why are the Clippers rarely/barely mentioned?

The Ally

Certainly, the problem can’t be the offense.

To clarify, the Clippers are leading the league in offensive efficiency for the second consecutive season, per NBA.com, and are currently ranked third in effective field goal percentage (eFG%) — only trailing the highly revered Golden State Warriors and the critically acclaimed Atlanta Hawks.

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The offense itself may not be a work of art — some may even consider it plain and unaesthetic — but the Clippers protect the ball better than any team in the league, save for the Hornets, and a Paul-Griffin high pick-and-roll (PNR) is as devastating as we had imagined it to be when the duo joined forces during the summer of 2011.

In particular, Paul, perhaps the best point guard of his generation, is still the most effective PNR negotiator in the NBA.

He may not live in the lane like he once did, nor does he instill the type of nerve-wracking anxiety on opposing defenses that a Russell Westbrook or a Stephen Curry does, but he is still the most efficacious decision maker while probing off of PNR sets — seemingly making the correct shoot/pass decision every time down the floor.

Meanwhile, his partner in crime, Griffin, has continued to add new elements to his game. Chiefly, he has worked tirelessly on his midrange jumper and ability to pick defenses apart with his passing after flaring out of the pick-and-pop.

Specifically, Griffin receives the second most elbow touches per game in the league, per NBA.com. Accordingly, he is converting on a career-best 40.7 percent of his shots from 16-24 feet, an area of the floor in which Blake attempts over 37.4 percent of field goal attempts, according to Basketball-Reference.

Comparatively, he only took 29.7 percent of his field goal attempts from 16-24 feet last season, where he converted said attempts on a 37.2 percent rate.

Moreover, Griffin has developed into, perhaps, the best passing big man in the association. Capitalizing on opposing defenses’ propensity to ice PNRs, Blake is highly effective flaring out to the elbow/nail area, receiving the pocket pass from Paul, using his refined jumper as leverage, and either whipping a pin point pass to a wide open corner shooter or lobbing it up to the basketball cyborg known as DeAndre Jordan.

For this reason, Griffin has increased his assist rate by over six percent this season, per Basketball-Reference. In fact, he leads all big men this year in said category.

As such, despite of the lack of cuts and weakside man movement their offense inherently fails to generate, with the amount of attention and distributing prowess that Paul and Griffin draws and possesses, it comes to no surprise that the Clippers are ranked within the top-five in three-point percentage, three-pointers made, and assist percentage, per NBA.com.

Players such as Barnes are the main beneficiaries, shooting a career best 37.1 percent from beyond the arc on over four attempts per game; while Jordan continues to treat the rims across all 30 NBA arenas as his own personal set of Nerf hoops, scoring on percentages that would’ve made Wilt Chamberlain and Artis Gilmore jealous.

The Enemies

The Clippers-watching experience is spearheaded by the cerebral dissection of Paul, the explosiveness of Griffin, and the high-wire act of Jordan; but it also comes with a shit ton of whining and flopping.

By now, the YouTube compilations and Vines dedicated to the artistry of Paul/Griffin flops are all over internet. I, personally, find it hilarious — but, by all accounts, it seems the rest of league is tired of the Clippers’ incessant act.

Sure enough, the Clippers lead the league in technical fouls, with 60; led by Barnes with 11 and Griffin with 10, per ESPN.

To make matters worse, Lob City can get totally discombobulated when calls don’t go their way — which ultimately creates an adverse effect on their performance .

This is especially true on the defensive end, where the Clippers deploy a scheme heavily dependent upon cohesion and synchronization.

Specifically, in an effort to exploit their bigs’ athletic strengths and hide their wings’ defensive shortcomings, the Clippers most often trap high PNRs a few steps beyond the three-point line — particularly when Griffin’s man serves as the screener — trusting their contingent of frontcourt players to successfully impede the opposing ballhandler’s aspiring foray to turn the corner, as the ballhandler’s man, usually Paul, vivaciously fights over the screen.

When the initial pass out of the trap is subsequently made; thereby, creating a 5-on-4 situation, the Clippers aim to alleviate the obstacle with crisp rotations from their perimeter wings, and communication for their recovering big — in regards to who to switch on to, or whether to zone up and protect the interior.

And while a fully engaged/motivated Clippers squad is highly capable of carrying out such a tenuous task; when distracted, their defensive breakdowns arrive in bunches.

Take, for example, their contest last Friday against the Toronto Raptors, a team experiencing their fair share of recent struggles. It was a game in which a vengeful Clippers team — coming off of a blowout lost against the streaking, but imperfect, Cleveland Cavaliers — rushed out to a 20-point lead in the first quarter, before relinquishing 76 points during the second and third as Toronto went on to outscore them by 31.

In the beginning of the game, the galvanized Clippers suffocated the Raptors guards with aggressive shows and synergistic rotations:

As the Raptors’ Kyle Lowry and Amir Johnson engage in a high PNR, Griffin aggressively shows as Paul slithers over the screen.

As the play develops, Lowry actually gets around Griffin as he looks to get into the paint. However, the Clippers’ contingent of help defenders slides into prime help positions.

In particular, Austin Rivers is a step away from either digging in on the Lowry penetration, or recovering back to his man, Greivis Vasquez.

Meanwhile, Jordan shifts over to the weakside in an effort to take away the Amir Johnson roll.

Accordingly, Barnes judiciously helps the helper, effectively zoning up on Jonas Valanciunas and DeMar DeRozan.

As the ball swings over to Vasquez, Rivers closes out aggressively, giving him no air space. As such, Paul recognizes Rivers’ effort to run Vasquez off the line and slides into dig position.

While this is happening, Barnes recovers back to the corner shooter, and likewise, Jordan back on the opposing big; as Griffin hustles back into the play.

Vasquez’s attempt to attack the aggressive closeout failed, and instead, opts to run another PNR with Johnson, as Griffin, once again, hard shows.

As such, Barnes begins to head over to the nail to provide help on the flaring Johnson.

The pressure put forth by Griffin and Rivers pays off, causing a deflection, courtesy of a Vasquez jump pass. But as you can see, even if the pass, attempted for Johnson, went through, the Clippers were ready to help.

Specifically, Paul took away the strongside corner shooter, Barnes was at the nail providing help on Johnson while remaining in recovery distance of DeRozan, as Jordan served as the backline of the defense.

However, as things turned sour, the Clippers’ level of effort would drop perspicuously; conceding penetration, as an avalanche of threes and layups were relented at their expense:

As DeRozan comes off the high PNR, Hawes shows, but not nearly as aggressively as Griffin did during the first quarter. In addition, Crawford struggles to fight over the Johnson screen.

Consequently, as Hawes sinks back, DeRozan decides to take him off the dribble.

However, notice how Rivers is nonchalantly upright, giving no indication of help — through the form of a dig or collapse — whatsoever.

Similarly, Crawford is trotting back into the picture after a half-hearted attempt at fighting over the screen.

As a result, DeRozan goes unimpeded for an and-1 layup — the story of the Clippers during the second and third quarters of the game.

More alarmingly, the Clippers currently give up the sixth most threes of any team in the association this season, per Basketball-Reference. They are especially vulnerable against stretch 4s on side PNR situations, where the combination of their skill set and the Clippers’ defensive philosophy allows such a player to slip the screen into a clean look at a strongside corner three.

The Giant Elephant In The Room

For a coach with a sterling reputation, known for his ability to motivate and inspire, one has to find it somewhat troubling how mentally unstable the Clippers are.

As the old adage goes, a team usually takes the personality of its coach; if so, what does the erratic, mercurial temperament of Lob City say about Doc Rivers? And at which point, do we discount his goodwill, in which he decisively earned when Rivers won an NBA championship seven years ago, and question his ability to juggle the dual roles of head coach and general manager?

From the debacle that was the Eric Bledsoe trade — where the team had to eventually give up a first rounder in order to trade one of the central pieces in said deal, in Jared Dudley — to trading an underutilized asset, in Reggie Bullock, and a future second round pick for his son, Austin Rivers (who, to be fair, has been playing some inspired basketball post-trade), in an effort save him from NBA purgatory, a.k.a the D-League, Doc has been downright terrible as a GM.

Moreover, all of his off-season signings has been bordering along middling to horrendous (Byron Mullens? C’mon Doc); his latest blunder appears to be giving Spencer Hawes a four-year $23 million contract this summer.

What the Clippers really need is an athletic wing, capable of playing both forward positions; however, with their recent aforementioned moves, their roster flexibility has been exacerbated.

To his credit, the 2009-10 Celtics also sleepwalked the entire regular season before rekindling their trademark intensity during the playoffs, on their way to the Finals that season.

Will the Clippers do the same? Or is this stretch of mental implosion a foreshadowing of what’s to come during the postseason?

Next: 5 Likely First Time NBA All-Stars Next Season

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