Indiana Pacers: Will The Offensive Sets Replicate Next Season?
By Shane Young
In the modern NBA product, you’re not going to completely buy in to the notion of “Defense wins championships.” In a game that’s not so predicated on quick, easy scores — such as the NFL — that’s entirely the case.
Top-notch NBA defenses that rank first in Defensive Rating haven’t won any of the last six Finals, the last one being accompanied by Kevin Garnett‘s “Anything is possible” chilling moment.
Take it for what it’s worth, but during Miami’s two-year run of winning back-to-back titles, their placement in Defensive Rating included a year at 100.2 (2011-12), and 103.7 (2012-13), both marks that didn’t reach the top three in the league. In Dirk Nowitzki‘s vengeance over Miami for the 2011 title, Dallas accumulated a Defensive Rating of 105.0, only eighth overall. What about Kobe and the Lakers’ days of repeating in 2009 & 2010? Nothing higher than fourth overall.
It takes a perfect combination of offensive prowess and defensive attention to capture a title. In 2013-14, San Antonio achieved that balance:
Before their catastrophic downfall after the All-Star break, the Indiana Pacers were on an All-Time high in terms of limiting offenses, and making opponents cringe at the idea of penetrating the paint. Roy Hibbert was giving evidence to Paul George‘s claim during the 2013 training camp, in which George explained that Indiana’s big man could rise to the best overall center.
If there was going to be a June parade in Indianapolis, it was because nobody could break triple digits on their defense. Even if we didn’t think it was possible, however, Frank Vogel’s offense suffered the lowest of the lows. Stacking Indiana against the squads you consider “title contenders,” you’d find nothing comparable on the offensive end. For a team that captured the Eastern Conference No. 1 seed, being the 10th slowest team in terms of Pace and the sixth worst offensive group by points scored stands out like a runny nose.
With the talent Vogel was grooming, though, there were indications of proficient offensive sets, and ones that would generate easy scores.
Installed in the Pacers’ offensive schemes are portions of the Flex Offense, a common entity in the NBA. Primarily, it’s found within teams that love to spread their attack to the 3-point line from all positions on the court. The gravity of flex rests on the thought of each player being versatile on the court. From 1-5, each must be able to excel without a true position, and perform any offensive action if an opportunity arises.
Igniting such an offense requires cuts across the lane, with players rotating from left to right and getting the defense in motion. For the cutter — usually the two-guard that’s moving toward the strong side of the court, there has to be perfect screens set for him to get the freedom to move without hesitation:
As Lance Stephenson determined he was slashing to the left side in the clip above (courtesy of YouTube’s How U), you notice 7’2″ Hibbert give a back screen to 6’3″ Brandon Knight, with the size difference making it impossible to recover in time. With someone as energetic as Stephenson, who also makes quick decisions when he has the ball, you can’t have his defender getting hindered:
Hibbert’s man (John Henson) can’t effectively leave Hibbert to rotate on Stephenson, because it would open up a world of destruction when Lance notices the mismatch on the big man.
Since Hibbert was an above-average screener and was solid with his timing, Knight being one step behind is all it takes for the paint to be unattended for Lance’s bucket:
The cut Stephenson made through the key is labeled as the “flex cut,” and it turned into the Pacers’ most favorable option when trying to create outside looks. It’s just so potent when the guard in motion is matched up against a smaller player that struggles on defense.
Besides scoring inside the paint upon receiving the pass, the flex cutter is able to use the entire side of the floor to operate. In this type of set, it’s pivotal that one of the wings slides to the top of the key, giving room for the cutter to enter post action:
As detailed above in the beginning of the play, Hibbert gives away his idea of a screen too early, but still manages to catch Tayshaun Prince with the body, allowing teammate Paul George to get to the strong side for Lance’s pass.
What this does, ultimately, is provides George the whole right side of the court to create on his own. More importantly, it forces the defense to make a decision that’s never easy. When there’s an All-Star & top four small forward in one-on-one isolations, what does it bring? Help defense. When the one-on-one is in the corner, the help is normally drawn from above the break, right behind the free throw line.
There’s a reason Memphis built a reputation for being the best perimeter defending team in the Western Conference, as they typically torment you in their man-to-man matchups and interior bruising. Having the defensive discipline, they don’t double team much unless they absolutely have to, and Tony Allen causes havoc on his own.
Here, however, Allen fails to stay with Stephenson after he makes the post-entry pass to George. Stephenson would begin to slip behind the other forward, usually David West since he was able to stave off bigger defenders:
When Indiana comes up the floor in these flex sets, it’s known that West should be the last screener. He carries his 11 years of experience with him, and he’s not always been a player that you shove down in the paint and ask to do one or two things. Chris Paul and Byron Scott made him versatile, and he knows the ins and outs of off-ball movement.
Knowing that Zach Randolph isn’t going to close out on Stephenson as well as a trailing Tony Allen would, he sets a heavy screen on Allen when the two Memphis teammates come close together:
Even if Randolph did step out to contest Stephenson assertively, the lane would be a clear path for “Born Ready” to penetrate. Why? His man (Allen) would be caught in a stranglehold, and Randolph wouldn’t have a prayer staying with Stephenson’s quick legs.
Just by looking at the play and where Memphis’ defenders are, you can see that a Lance blow-by would force Mike Conley to collapse, and open George Hill on the wing even more.
The flex principles work in a magical way, and it’s not hard to see why NBA coaches love the sets just as much as any coach at a lower level. These techniques are usually taught at lower levels of the sport, because it stresses extreme ball movement and that’s the central idea you ingrain in a young player’s head.
Having Luis Scola at the power forward slot instead of West, the Pacers realized how smooth things have to go in order to get their shooter a clean look at the top of the key. When Danny Granger was a part of the roster, he would be the bench replacement for guard that’s playing off-ball, and receiving the pass. Scola used to be given credit for being an aggressive player, but he’s been relatively soft in Indiana, and didn’t make the job easier for Granger on the flex post-ups:
You notice Eric Gordon getting clear of the Scola screen rather easily, and making it a hard, off-balanced attempt for Granger. The veteran still nailed it, but the general idea is that the pass out of the post needs to be accompanied by a hard screen.
This set can also work with the entry pass (to the post) coming late, instead of right when the cutter gets to the other corner. This is what happens when smart, active defenders (Luol Deng) go over the Hibbert screen instead of trailing behind George:
In this sequence, it’s West setting the screen again, which led to success more than failure. It illustrates just how versatile guys need to be on the court, and it encourages more than a couple 3-point threats on the roster. For a team that finished 25th in 3-point shooting (18.8 attempts per game), the Pacers weren’t your gangbusters from outside. Mainly, it was due to Chris Copeland never rising off the bench, because of Vogel’s unwillingness to tinker with the rotation.
Unlike George (injury) and Stephenson (in Charlotte), Copeland will be one of the only wing talents returning for the Pacers this upcoming season, meaning he’ll have to be prepared. Throwing him in the mix with newcomers C.J. Miles and Damjan Rudez, being able to create the space and give the Pacers a better identity from long range should be easier than last season. Where they’ll suffer, however, is having their two best passers and play-makers missing from the lineup to create these opportunities.
The rest of the league caught on to the Pacers’ use of this set, and most of their counter-tactics became detrimental.
Just as Charlotte has figured out how they would defend the entry pass into Lance, they try to force help near the corner by Cody Zeller sliding way off West:
Against a unit that doesn’t have a “stretch four,” having your big (Zeller) slide down to disrupt the entry would be smart. Nonetheless, David West shot 52.2 percent from 15-19 feet away from the basket, making 145 of 278 attempts. He’s known as a deadly mid-range power forward, the top 10 in that category when judging bigs that can shoot.
This flex post option creates so many variations in what you can do, that it leads to just a simple pass from George Hill to West, and Zeller can’t recover in time to contest adequately.
An identical sequence can happen on the other side of the floor, with both the entry-feeder (Stephenson) and mid-range shooter (Scola) being completely different than what you saw above. Sometimes, it doesn’t even matter if the defender (Gerald Wallace) pops out to contest in time. If he gives too much help to the post and leaves Scola with room to breathe, count it:
If the play does indeed reach the point where Indiana is looking to get their shooter open (at the “above the break” area), there are some instances where that player will draw a double team with the power forward’s defender. In this set, it’s Quincy Acy that attacks Danny Granger off the dribble, and he’s helping Marcus Thornton (coming around the screen):
It leads to another bread-and-butter shot for Scola, who was initially the screener. With all the movement on the strong side, options open up with every pass. Even if Granger did get into the paint without the double, there’s Jimmer Fredette who would likely slide over, and open up the left corner for a dish to Hill.
Everything they run with an intelligent wing player and a power forward capable of shooting can be replaced next season. Miles is better at filling this role than Granger nowadays, and Rodney Stuckey doesn’t get enough credit for playing team-first ball. He’ll make the right decisions off these scenarios, if Vogel chooses to run it the same way.
What Indiana will miss the most, perhaps, is Stephenson’s mind-boggling sense of how to create a bucket when the play dies down, or when everything is stationary. In the NBA, it’s called making something out of nothing:
Stephenson now brings his craftiness to the Hornets, who needed offensive variation other than just letting Al Jefferson draw all of the attention in the paint. Now, they have three dependable options to get their offense flowing, and Kemba Walker is able to be more of a second perimeter option some trips up the floor.
As for the Pacers, it begins with exploring how the rotation should be set. Vogel can still use the flex post-ups effectively and on a regular basis, but the shooters can’t be parked on the bench. The two departures of George and Stephenson may be a blessing in disguise for Copeland, C.J. Watson, and point guard George Hill.
Maybe now we see an even heavier focus on ball movement and unselfish offense — two aspects they needed lectures on after the All-Star break.
**All statistical support credited to Basketball-Reference and NBA.com/Stats**