The Detroit Pistons had one of the more peculiar summers in the NBA, but is that necessarily a bad thing? In their 2017 offseason grades, we explore each move in relation to that question.
How does a team have one of the most mocked offseasons in the NBA, while simultaneously having the best offseason in its division? Playing in the Central Division helps.
For the Detroit Pistons, however, it is about more than that. It is about the importance of opportunity vs. opportunity cost, value vs. evaluation and process vs. result.
The 2017-18 Pistons will not be a materially different team than they were last year. Whether or not they get back into the playoffs will depend more on incumbent leaders Andre Drummond and Reggie Jackson than it will on any of their additions or subtractions. They are still a franchise without a direction, though they are also a young team trending slightly upwards. Both things can be true.
Here is a look at each major move from Detroit’s 2017 offseason.
Drafting Luke Kennard
The value of draft position is so dependent on the class. Despite the 2017 group’s early reputation as a special one, No. 12 was not as desirable a spot as in other years.
Given that the Pistons sat right outside this supposed 11-player draft, they had three reasonable choices: trade the pick, draft Luke Kennard or draft Donovan Mitchell.
Mitchell was the most popular option at the time, and an impressive NBA Summer League has turned him into an early “steal” for the Utah Jazz, who traded up to draft him at No. 13. But if you take Summer League for what it is — NBA-style basketball played by mostly non-NBA players — Kennard’s performance was more impressive.
While Mitchell picked on inferior athletes and ball-handlers, Kennard flashed consistency from NBA range, an adept pick-and-roll game and advanced scoring moves.
It is still unclear what Mitchell is. He has the strength and length to play the 3, but nowhere near the height (he’s 6’3″). He is years away from conceivably running the point, and probably a year or two away from hitting NBA 3-pointers consistently as an off-guard.
Kennard is a prototypical 2. He is 6’6″, stretches the floor, can serve as a secondary ball-handler and threatens the defense as an on-ball or off-ball scorer. He will never be a switch guy, but defending shooting guards well is within reach given his frame and adequate agility.
It is easy to look at a pick like Kennard and not be blown away. But when a team makes the right choice, especially when it is unpopular at the time, they deserve full credit.
Grade: A
Signing Langston Galloway
Stan Van Gundy, like many coaches who are also their team’s president of basketball operations, prioritizes “his guys.” I spoke with Duncan Smith of PistonPowered, who expounded on this issue.
"“I think Van Gundy and (general manager Jeff) Bower have this approach where they like to get these guys signed and over with early on, even if that means overspending…I’m quite sure they could have gotten Jon Leuer for less than $10 million a year last summer, but on the plus side, they got it wrapped up early.”"
The Langston Galloway signing was no different. Detroit threw a three-year, $21 million offer his way on July 1, which was a no-brainer for the 25-year-old combo guard to accept.
The signing is fine in a vacuum. The Pistons desperately needed shooting at the point guard position. If Van Gundy the coach wanted Galloway specifically for this role, there is no reason to question him. The price was high, but not inherently crippling.
In context, it was far more damaging, shaping the two defining moves of Detroit’s offseason. Things more or less worked out in the end (more on that soon), but that was in direct spite of this move.
Grade: D
Renouncing Kentavious Caldwell-Pope
Galloway’s cap hit made retaining Kentavious Caldwell-Pope improbable. With roughly $20 million worth of room to operate below the hard cap, a max offer sheet would have forced Detroit to clear salary quickly before matching.
Perhaps the Pistons did not want to match at that price. Given Caldwell-Pope’s limited skill-set and tepid development, that line of thinking is understandable. Maybe they had intel that an offer was coming, so they renounced him in an effort to clear his cap hold and move on. (For what it’s worth, the Galloway signing did not receive an “F” based on the possibility that they had no intention of paying big for KCP.)
As with the Galloway signing, reality does not line up with this benefit-of-the-doubt explanation. Caldwell-Pope ended up going to the Lakers on a one-year, $18 million deal, a far cry from the nine-figure sheet Detroit was seemingly afraid of.
Maybe Caldwell-Pope was unhappy. Maybe Detroit knew of the Avery Bradley trade opportunity before it happened. Regardless, having match rights on the summer’s best restricted free agent and losing him for nothing is never a good thing. That they did so on their own volition (and possibly because of a cap miscalculation) makes it all the worse.
Grade: D
Trading for Avery Bradley
Shortly after renouncing Caldwell-Pope, the Pistons struck a deal for Avery Bradley. They sent Marcus Morris (two years, $10 million) to the Boston Celtics in exchange for the final year ($9 million) of the 26-year-old shooting guard’s contract.
The trade was a grand slam. Bradley is a better player than Caldwell-Pope on both ends of the floor, and is only two years older. He will be more affordable this season, and perhaps more worth paying next summer. Morris is on a good contract, but was redundant on Detroit’s roster, and is an inferior overall player to Bradley.
The move made so much sense, in fact, that it almost makes the previous head-scratchers appear planned.
The logic goes like this: Draft Kennard, a prototypical 2-guard, as insurance. Sign a sweet-shooting combo guard in Galloway as further insurance. Replace KCP with a better player at a cheaper price in Bradley. If Bradley walks, Kennard may be ready to step in next season.
We should not grade each move in this context. It is just as likely (if not more so) that the Pistons lucked into this chain of events than it is that they planned it out. However, the Bradley move deserves full marks for bringing this all together.
Grade: A+
Signed Anthony Tolliver
Another reason the Morris trade was a major win: Chemistry. Duncan Smith spoke to me on why this was a serious issue for Detroit last season:
"“Morris was supposedly this team’s biggest leader last year. But if we look at the things that gave him that reputation, we’ve got the ‘players only’ meeting in December, where the team’s quote-unquote leadership essentially ripped on Reggie Jackson for an hour after a game for not moving the ball. In that game, Reggie had 10 assists and took 15 shots.”"
This, more than anything, was the impetus for giving Tolliver a one-year, $3.3 million deal. Smith also pointed out that his return was also a mea culpa of sorts from Van Gundy:
"“When things were rough, especially towards the end of the year, there was really nobody who had been through the trenches…Tolliver was that guy two years ago for the Pistons, and I’d say that Stan was aware that letting him go (in 2016) was a mistake.”"
As different as they are as players, Tolliver is essentially replacing Morris both on and off the court. He should provide similar floor-spacing and two-way play at the 3 and the 4, but can do so in fewer minutes without raising a stink. Given Detroit’s depth at forward (Tobias Harris and Stanley Johnson are combo guys like Tolliver, while Jon Leuer and Henry Ellenson should play some 4), there may not be more than 15 minutes to go around.
In the locker room, Tolliver can be the steadying presence that Morris seemingly was not. For a young team that stagnated in its development last season, this is crucial. It is also a shrewd marginal signing, a far cry from the Galloway deal.
Grade: A
Re-signed Reggie Bullock
With Drummond and Jackson as core pieces, the Pistons will never add what seems like too much shooting. They shot 33 percent from deep last year (No. 28 in the league), and spent this offseason addressing the issue.
Re-signing Reggie Bullock fits that M.O. The 26-year-old forward shot a career-high 38.4 percent last year, though he only appeared in 31 games.
He has struggled mightily with health and consistency throughout his career, so it is unrealistic to expect much this season. At two years and $5 million with the second year not guaranteed, however, there was little reason not to bring him back. He has more upside than most minimum-level swingmen, and is familiar with the system.
With that being said, there is a level of risk here. Detroit is entering the season with a rookie, the injury-prone Bradley and the extremely injury-prone Bullock as its only viable shooting guards.
Grade: C
Overall
When viewed together, the shooting Detroit has added is quite impressive. Kennard was arguably the draft’s most NBA-ready 3-point threat. Galloway shot 39.0 percent on 1.6 made threes last season. Bradley’s shooting numbers (46.0 FG%, 39.0 3P%, 2.0 3PM) dwarf those of Caldwell-Pope (39.9 FG%, 35.0 3P%, 2.0 3PM). Tolliver shot 39.1 percent last season.
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Before getting too excited thought, it should be noted that each of these players has a career average closer to 36 percent than 39. However, save Tolliver, they are all young. It is possible in each case that last year was a breakout rather than a blip.
Losing Caldwell-Pope for nothing hurts, but that does not mean overpaying for him would have been better. Players are only as helpful as the contracts they’re on. By locking into four years of KCP at $25 million annually, Detroit would be tying a quarter of its money to a 24-year-old still living partially on potential.
Things did not have to work out as perfectly as they did. That has to be considered when grading this offseason. At the same time, luck is part of the business.
If we look back at the chain of events, from Kennard to here, the end result is positive. The Pistons are better on paper today than they were in April. They have better overall young talent, and have an extra year to decide if its worth locking in to this core. Ultimately, good results outweigh shaky process.
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Final Grade: B